Today, it feels as if geopolitics is a game scripted, twisted, and replayed at the whims of one capital—Washington, and more precisely: Donald Trump. His mercurial policies and sudden resets are not just redrawing alliances but also forcing countries to constantly recalibrate their foreign policy stance.
The turbulence of Trump’s world is not just background noise, it is an everyday strategic dilemma. The recent meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska stirred speculation about shifting alignments in the global order.
Trump’s outreach to these nations is seen as a strategic gambit, not nostalgia for Putin, but a “reverse Kissinger” strategy. In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger opened the door to China to contain the Soviet Union. Today, Washington dreams of peeling Moscow away from Beijing to contain China. But for India, this realignment poses a problem; if Washington warms simultaneously to Moscow and Beijing, New Delhi risks being pushed to the margin of an evolving balance of power.
But India’s immediate concern lies closer to home: the Himalayan frontier with China. Despite multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks, the business of disengagement remains unfinished.
Reports indicate that Indian troops still face restrictions on patrolling, while local herdsmen continue to be denied access to grazing grounds in “buffer zones” they traditionally frequented.
Wang Yi’s recent visit to New Delhi, coming on the heels of his high-profile stop in Islamabad, added layers of complexity. In Pakistan, he declared that the “ironclad friendship” between Beijing and Islamabad was “unbreakable,” underlining China’s South Asian balancing act.
While in New Delhi, his outreach carried both signals of de-escalation and veiled pressure. Beijing simultaneously pushes ahead with constructing the world’s largest hydropower project on the Brahmaputra in Tibet, close to the Indian border, ignoring India’s lower riparian concerns.
China’s actions are puzzling but calculated. By offering de-escalation talks while advancing projects that threaten India’s strategic water security, Beijing keeps pressure points alive. On the One-China policy, New Delhi has maintained consistency, refusing to dilute its position despite heightened tensions.
Simultaneously, both India and China have found rare convergence in opposing what they term “unilateral bullying” from Washington. Yet this fragile overlap cannot mask the reality that Beijing’s assertiveness is still here to stay, and India must act with caution.
Overlay this with Trump’s Alaska gambit with Russia, and the contours of a changing world order become clearer. If Washington and Moscow reduce their hostility, China may find itself subtly squeezed, a development India could exploit diplomatically. But history warns us not to take Trump’s overture at face value: his unpredictability is his only constant.
For India, therefore, strategy must rest not on speculation about Trump’s impulses but on a long-term recalibration of its own place in a multipolar world.
Henry Kissinger’s balance of power theory resonates strongly today. The Cold War was defined by a bipolar struggle; the post-Cold War decades by American unipolarity. But the 2020s are unmistakably multipolar, marked by shifting alignments and fragmented solidarities.
The Alaska meeting, the assertiveness of Europe in resisting US dominance, the Indo-Pacific alliances, and China’s Pakistan axis all signal the blurring of neat binaries.
What then should New Delhi’s playbook be? First, if Asia’s two strongest players, India and China, can sustain channels of cooperation, both stand to benefit, not only for each other but for Asia as a whole, for they also recognise that prolonged hostility carries immense risks. As Kuldip Singh, a retired army officer, observes, war between India and China is never a lucrative venture: Beijing gains little by fighting a near-peer competitor. Even a military victory would leave China weakened economically and politically, and strategically undermine its pursuit of “great power” status vis-à-vis the United States.
Second, India must strengthen its economic resilience. China’s hydropower gamble is a reminder that economic vulnerabilities translate directly into strategic risks. Water security, technology, supply chains, and critical minerals must form the new pillars of India’s security doctrine.
Third, India must invest more in narratives. Beijing and Islamabad have mastered the art of framing their ties as “ironclad.” India must project its civilizational ethos and democratic pluralism as soft power anchors in a world where narratives matter as much as navies.
The world order is shifting; neither America’s word nor China’s weight can be taken as absolute.
The age of great-power flux demands an India that is nimble, assertive, and imaginative. India’s game is not merely to react but to shape, ensuring that neither Beijing’s ambitions nor Washington’s impulsive deals undermine its rise.
By Shyna Gupta
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