It is 26 years since Pakistan was inflicted a humiliating defeat over the Kargil heights by India. Pakistan was so cornered and desperate to end the war that the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rushed to the United States, where an annoyed President Bill Clinton issued him a clear ultimatum to either ask his army to withdraw from Kargil or see the US siding with India.
Being fair to Sharif, he had no role in the war and he was made to suffer the humiliation because of his audaciously ambitious Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf. It was Musharraf who had conceived, planned and executed the Kargil incursions in one of the toughest terrains in the world.
A similar script is unfolding in Pakistan once again with the current army chief, Asim Munir, who got himself designated as the Field Marshal, calling the shots and cocking a snook at the civilian government. In fact, Munir has positioned himself in such a way that foreign governments have started recognising him as the de facto “ruler” of Pakistan. His special invitation to the White House by the US President Donald Trump, for whatever reasons, and now his visit to China are all indicators towards the “recognition” of his “supreme authority” in Pakistan over and above the civilian government there.
The Kargil War did not happen because of the civilian government of Pakistan headed that time by Nawaz Sharif, the elder brother of the current Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. It happened because of an over-ambitious army Chief, Musharraf, who later staged a coup and assumed formal power in Pakistan.
In 1998, India tested the atomic bomb for the second time. Pakistan followed it up as it did not want to be seen lagging behind India in terms of nuclear capability. There is a theory that it was the US which helped Pakistan to test the nuclear bomb to keep India under check, and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is under the complete control of the US.
However, both countries put their atomic tests behind them and moved forward with negotiations. Or it was because of the fact that both the countries were now “pronounced and proclaimed” nuclear powers, they felt that they should opt for peace rather than war, which was going to be mutually fatal for both of them.
Within less than a year, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee went on a bus journey in February 1999 to Lahore. He was personally received at the Wagah border by his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif. Vajpayee was accompanied by senior ministers and also the then Punjab Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal. He spent two days in Lahore and it led to a lot of bonhomie between the two countries.
However, it did not last long. While the two Prime Ministers along with their respective ministerial colleagues and senior officials were engaged in working out a roadmap for a better relationship between the two countries, the then Pakistan army Chief Pervez Musharraf was planning the Kargil incursions. Musharraf had abstained from all the programmes of the visiting Indian Prime Minister, which was somewhat unusual. His absence was conspicuous. It was later revealed that he had different plans and different intentions.
As it later turned out, Musharraf had planned to cut off the crucial Srinagar-Leh highway near Kargil. Had he succeeded in doing that, the entire Ladakh region would have been cut off, and obviously, it would have led to a more fierce battle between the two countries than they fought.
The Pakistan Army had got an initial advantage by occupying the heights, bringing the Srinagar-Ladakh highway under direct fire. It was indeed a tough job for the Indian Army to reach those heights with an extremely hostile terrain above 14,000 feet. But the brave Indian soldiers recovered the occupied territory, delivering a crushing defeat to Pakistan.
As happened during the recent skirmishes in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, that Pakistan wanted a ceasefire within four days of the war and approached the United States, the same thing happened in July 1999 when Nawaz Sharif rushed to the United States. It was July 4, the US Independence Day.
There was a holiday in the US. The then US President could not offer even lunch or tea to the visiting Pakistani Prime Minister, who had his food in the Pakistani embassy after meeting Clinton.
Sharif wanted Clinton to broker a ceasefire with India, which he bluntly refused. Clinton straightaway told Sharif that he would not interfere, come what may.
Later, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told Parliament that Clinton had told him that Sharif was traveling to the US and invited him to come there. Vajpayee refused, telling Clinton to convey to Sharif that he should withdraw his forces from the Indian territory. Clinton precisely did that, and Sharif was left with no option but to withdraw from the Kargil heights without any agreement or assurance.
Coming back to the current phase in India-Pakistan relations, the current Pakistan army chief Asim Munir seems to be following in the footsteps of Musharraf.
He seems to have learnt from Musharraf’s experience. While Musharraf tried to do it all by himself and his army, Munir is trying to woo the Pentagon and China, which nevertheless is already a military ally of Pakistan.
The Pahalgam terror attack was the brainchild of Munir. Just a few days before the terror attack, he had dropped clear hints about a long-drawn fight with India, even using the words Hindus and Muslims, saying they cannot live together, while addressing non-resident Pakistani expatriates. He had again bypassed the political leadership that day while resorting to war-mongering. His calculations were clear that a terror attack of that scale, which took place in Pahalgam, would provoke Indian retribution, which India did. In return, the Pakistan Army tried some face-saving, enough to earn Munir the title of Field Marshal.
Like Musharraf, Munir would not stop merely at being designated as the Field Marshal. In all likelihood, he would go further and fully follow in the footsteps of Musharraf by toppling the civilian government and assuming formal control. It would be strange if that does not happen. And till that does not happen, he will keep on trying to resort to different sorts of misadventures, like Musharraf’s Kargil War. The Kargil script remains there, ready to be unfolded whenever Munir feels like, irrespective of the retribution Pakistan and its army will have to face, like it faced in 1999. But that is the way the Pakistan army and its commanders survive.
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