recusal-syndrome-grips-indian-judiciary

Lately, the expression ‘recusal’ has gained prominence in judicial matters, with several judges resorting to this act in various cases for different reasons. Before delving deeper into the issue, it is important to understand what it actually means in judicial parlance and what its implications are.

 

Recusal is the act of abstaining from participation in an official action, such as a legal proceeding, due to a conflict of interest of the presiding court official or administrative officer.

 

There are no formal rules governing recusals, although several Supreme Court judgments have dealt with the issue. The practice stems from the cardinal principle of due process of law that nobody can be a judge in their own case. Any interest or conflict of interest constitutes a ground to withdraw from a case since a judge has a duty to act fairly. The decision to recuse generally comes from the judge themself, as it rests on the conscience and discretion of the judge to disclose any potential conflict of interest.

 

Some judges orally convey their reasons for recusal to the lawyers involved in a case, while others do not. Some record their reasons in an order.

 

In a rare case in Indian jurisprudence, nearly 16 judges, from the Supreme Court, High Courts, Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), and District Courts — have recused themselves from hearing the case of Indian Forest Service (IFS) officer Sanjiv Chaturvedi of the Uttarakhand cadre. Chaturvedi is known for exposing corruption and misuse of authority in governance at AIIMS, Haryana, and the Uttarakhand Forest Department, where he served.

 

His legal battles over service matters, central deputations, appraisal reports, and contempt proceedings against CAT members have triggered this unprecedented series of withdrawals without any reasons being assigned. The situation was eventually salvaged when the Chief Justice of the Uttarakhand High Court, after Justice Alok Verma stepped aside from a contempt petition (marking the 16th recusal), directed the registry to list the case before his bench.

 

This sequence of recusals, both surprising and unprecedented, has become a topic of intense discussion among civil servants and in the media. In the past, judges have recused themselves from cases where they had previously appeared as advocates or had some connection with the matter.

 

Common sense dictates that this issue must be debated in the public interest, as the judiciary is the final recourse for justice against bureaucratic or political high-handedness. Over the past few decades, the Indian judiciary has taken proactive steps through bold judicial interventions to correct errant executive actions. In Chaturvedi’s case, however, there appears no discernible reason for bias warranting so many recusals, as most matters pertain to service-related grievances and harassment.

 

This is a piquant situation for the Indian judiciary, and the Supreme Court must decide under what circumstances a judge may recuse themself; otherwise, it risks being seen as an abdication of the judiciary’s duty to ensure natural justice.

 

Recusal is backed by constitutional principles ensuring natural justice under Article 14 (Right to Equality) and Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). It is justified only when hearing by a particular judge could infringe upon these rights, consistent with the maxim nemo judex in causa sua (“no one should be a judge in their own cause”).

 

Recusal prevents actual or apparent bias, encompassing personal, pecuniary, or professional conflicts. The Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) held that recusal safeguards public confidence in the judiciary. Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2021), the Court clarified that judges must recuse themselves if there is reasonable apprehension of bias, though they retain discretion and need not disclose detailed reasons to avoid compromising judicial independence.

 

Under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 479), parties can seek transfer of cases if bias is alleged, but judges usually initiate recusal suo motu. The same principle applies in administrative tribunals like CAT, governed by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, where members recuse themselves under service rules.

 

This case, however, poses a challenge to the legal system if accepted as a precedent, allowing convenient avoidance of cases against government functionaries or those considered burdensome. Most recusals in Chaturvedi’s cases, including by Supreme Court Justices Ranjan Gogoi (2013) and U.U. Lalit (2016), and CAT members Harvinder Upal and B. Anand (2025), were made without citing reasons, fuelling speculation of external pressure or “forum shopping” by adversaries.

 

Such a pattern violates the spirit of Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957), where the Court held that even the “probability” of bias vitiates proceedings. For a tenacious officer like Chaturvedi, protected under the Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2014, such repeated recusals erode the right to constitutional remedies under Article 32, amounting to a denial of speedy justice.

 

While individual recusals are legally unassailable, their cumulative effect could attract scrutiny for systemic bias, potentially leading to public interest litigation (PIL) on judicial accountability.

 

Chaturvedi’s case also exposes how the system once helped him through Presidential intervention but later sought to suppress him for exposing corruption. In several cases, administrative members of CATs have acted as extensions of the government, undermining natural justice. There are also instances of “forum shopping” by senior bureaucrats influencing tribunal members.

 

The Uttarakhand High Court Chief Justice’s order to hear Chaturvedi’s case himself has set an encouraging precedent. Yet, the Supreme Court must pursue broader reforms to ensure transparency. Judicial codes should be amended to list non-prejudicial grounds for recusal, as recommended by the Justice J.S. Verma Committee (2018) on judicial accountability. A recusing judge should issue a speaking order explaining why they are stepping aside and how hearing the case could impede natural justice.