unravelling-the-why-and-what-of-the-indus-water-treaty

By Brig RPS Kahlon, VSM (Retd)

 

The immediate punitive consequence of the Pahalgam Massacre was suspension of the Indus Water Treaty by India. There has been a lot of hype and media speculation on the effectiveness of this action. To comprehend the impact, it is essential to understand the Treaty in its historical context.

 

The seeds of contention and Indus water wars were laid in the flawed bifurcation of the Indian subcontinent based on religion, rather than geographical and economic viability. The hastily drawn Radcliff line carved out a Pakistan, blessed with the most modern and extensive canal system, but with the head works which controlled the flow of water, located in India.

 

The newly independent Pakistan set about to correct this anomaly with possible covert support of the British. It can in hindsight be speculated that the urgency to amalgamate/ invade J&K was more a case of securing the water resources, than encompassing a contiguous Muslim majority princely state. The Gilgit Agency was deviously handed over to Pakistan by the British Garrison Commander. If the subsequent tribal invasion of J&K been successful, the waters of Indus, Jhelum and to a certain extent Chenab would have been assured for Pakistan, but that was not to be.

 

As feared the Indian Government withheld waters, in April 1948 on expiry of the standstill Agreement. In May 1948, an Inter-Dominion Accord, which required India to provide water to Pakistan in return of annual payments was signed.

 

 

In 1951, it was suggested that an agreement to jointly administer the Indus River system, with intervention of World Bank be considered. After protracted talks, the Indus Waters Treaty was ratified in September 1960.

 

The treaty gave the waters of the western rivers - Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab - to Pakistan and those of the eastern rivers - Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej - to India. India got 16 per cent (41 billion m3) whereas Pakistan got the rest (218 billion m3 at 84 per cent). 

 

A transition period of 10 years was mandated for Pakistan to build the canal system based on the western rivers, while India provided water from the eastern rivers as hither to fore. It is pertinent to note that this water supply by India was not interrupted even during the 1965 Indo-Pak war.

 

The Treaty also provided for the funding and building of dams, link canals, barrages (notably Tarbela Dam, on Indus River and Mangla Dam on Jhelum) in Pakistan. Much of the financing was contributed by World Bank. India made a fixed contribution of UK Pound Sterling 62,060,000/ (sixty-two million and sixty thousand or 125 metric tons of gold when gold standard was followed), over ten equal instalments. After signing the IWT, the then prime minister Nehru stated in the Parliament that India had purchased a (water) settlement, not stated was that India could now expedite the prestigious Bhakra-Nangal project.

 

The treaty mandated a Permanent Indus Commission, with a commissioner from each country, to maintain a channel for communication for implementation of the treaty. The system for resolving disputes include a neutral expert mechanism to resolve technical issues and a court of arbitration mechanism for broader and binding adjudications.

 

To utilise the waters of the eastern rivers, India has constructed Bhakra Dam on Sutlej, Pong and Pandoh Dam on Beas, and Thein (Ranjit Sagar Dam) on Ravi river. India utilises nearly 95 per cent of its entire share of the water of eastern rivers with the help of works like Beas-Sutlej Link, Madhopur-Beas Link, Indira Gandhi Nahar Project, etc. However, about 2 million acre feet (MAF) of water from Ravi is annually still flowing unutilised to Pakistan below Madhopur. India hopes to remedy this by the construction of the Shahpur Kandi Project, Ujh Multipurpose Project and the second Ravi Beas Link below Ujh.

 

India as per the treaty can also use the western rivers water for irrigation with new water storage capacity not exceeding 1.54 billion m3 and new ‘run of the river’ storage works with hydroelectric power plants. The planned Indian projects towards this end, notably Kishanganga and Ratle Hydroelectric Power Projects were objected to by Pakistan. The Tulbul Project was suspended in 1987 after Pakistan objected to it. While Kishanganga has been completed, and Ratle Hydroelectric project has been cleared by World Bank, India is likely to review the Tulbul Project in view of the recent suspension of the treaty.

 

The purported Pakistan fear in all these and other multitude of similar projects, not specifically mentioned here, is that India will develop the capability to control the flow of water downstream, wherein water would be released during rains but denied during the dry season, effectively negating the viability of the Pakistan Kharif crop. If the Indus Water Treaty is abrogated, which is the next possible step after suspension, the monitoring mechanisms for early warning of release of water upstream will no longer exist leading to disastrous ecological impact downstream in Pakistan. 

 

This does present a viable threat to Pakistan’s food, social and economic security, albeit in long term once the ongoing Indian projects are completed, possibly over a period of the next decade. Pakistan has a cause to be concerned and worried, while India has a potential tool which can be effectively developed for coercion to deter cross border terrorism by Pakistan proxies.

 

To conclude, India has been more than generous and fair, as far as sharing common Indus River Basin water resources is concerned. The Indus Water Treaty has stood the test of time, more because of India’s patience, in spite of three wars, than Pakistan’s nit-picking of Indian projects upstream on technical grounds.

 

Pakistan has so far raised more than 100 such objections. India has reason to seek a review of the bilateral Indus Water Treaty based on this obstructionist behaviour.

 

The Pakistan army chief was correct in his assertion that J&K is the jugular vein of Pakistan. Restricting and controlling the flow of water from J&K to Pakistan by India can strangulate Pakistan. To do so, India needs to develop its ongoing projects to store and control the flow of water into Pakistan, which would take time.

 

Suspension of the Treaty allows India to fast track these and additional projects. The suspension is a signal of intent; execution of the planned projects will signal capability. The ball is now in Pakistan’s court to consider its way forward. Pakistan needs to decide fast, before the time runs out.